China is building an ocean‑to‑ocean logistics spine across Latin America while our regional trade architecture idles. If Beijing keeps turning the hemisphere into a Belt and Road annex, Washington should make its red line unmistakable: continued One China policy is conditional on China respecting the Monroe sphere.
The map in our backyard is changing fast
The United States cannot afford to lose access to the strategic resource reserves that exist for our exploitation in Central and South America.
China is not “arriving” in the Americas. It has arrived. A Chinese‑financed megaport at Chancay, Peru is now ramping operations, giving Beijing its first deep‑water Pacific hub on this side of the world. Brazil signed a feasibility pact with China for a transcontinental rail corridor that would move soy, ore, and manufactured goods from the Atlantic to the Pacific in one integrated chain. Colombia joined Beijing’s initiative frameworks and is tapping the BRICS development bank. Across the Southern Cone, Chinese capital is buying future leverage in electricity grids, lithium brines, copper concentrators, and EV factories. Even small Central American states now court Chinese state builders for grid upgrades and dams.
None of these projects are isolated. Together they form a throughput system that reduces distance to Chinese buyers and lenders while raising switching costs for our neighbors. Every new port concession, swap line, and rail study deepens a pattern: China offers speed, finance, and turnkey delivery, then embeds itself in logistics, power, and minerals. That is how spheres of influence work in the 21st century. The flag follows the invoice.
Crushing Chinese influence in our sphere:
Free trade is dead. The U.S. erects a hemispheric tariff wall and opens controlled gates only through Production & Security Compacts (PSCs). PSCs are openly mercantilist: a colony–suzerain split of functions. The United States sells finished manufactures and capital goods; partners sell raw and midstream inputs and host logistics and energy. We do not buy partner finished manufactures that displace American industry; we sell them ours.
Terms that bite: a negative list that bans or tightly quotas partner exports of finished electronics, autos, white goods, and machine tools into the U.S.; zero‑ or low‑duty entry for raw and midstream inputs (ores, concentrates, cathodes, resins, fertilizers, refined fuels) tied to auditable rules‑of‑origin; automatic surcharges for any PRC equity, software control, or components in critical nodes; U.S.-flag carriage preference on strategic routes; USD clearing through supervised correspondent banks; no investor‑state arbitration; roaming audit rights. Compliance increases access; violations trigger penalties and procurement blacklisting. Inside the wall, we set export targets for U.S. manufactures into partner markets—servers, networking gear, machine tools, rail stock, grid hardware, pharmaceuticals—using procurement commitments and export finance to force market share. PSCs are not charity; they are power plus clarity.
One China is a policy, not a sacrament
The United States recognizes the PRC as the government of China. It does not recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Communiqués, and the Six Assurances define an intentionally ambiguous posture. That posture is policy, set by elected leaders to serve American interests. It can be revised if those interests require it.
Beijing treats our One China posture as a permanent concession. It is not. If China insists on turning our hemisphere into a logistics dependency and strategic staging zone, then the price of that behavior must be placed where Beijing is most sensitive. The PRC’s global legitimacy campaign rests on the claim that all major powers accept its narrative about Taiwan. Threatening to withdraw that acceptance is leverage they cannot ignore.
Make it explicit: Monroe compliance for One China
Washington should connect behavior in the Americas to our posture on Taiwan. The doctrine is simple. If China limits itself to normal commerce here and refrains from strategic control of ports, power grids, telecom backbones, and overland corridors, the U.S. maintains the status quo of unofficial Taiwan ties. If China keeps consolidating strategic control of hemispheric nodes, we escalate our Taiwan posture. Our recognition policy becomes the meter on Beijing’s influence in our neighborhood.
This is not performative. It sets a price for unwanted activity that Beijing actually cares about. Tariffs can be absorbed or rerouted. Recognition cannot. It reframes the conversation from haggling over tariff points to a question Chinese leadership treats as existential.
The escalation ladder
Rung 1: PSC with Taiwan (no FTA). Open a Production & Security Compact covering co‑production in munitions, ship repair, secure compute, and medical precursors. Grant targeted tariff preferences inside the hemispheric wall for PSC categories with strict ROO and export‑control alignment. Elevate Taipei’s office to “Representative Office of Taiwan,” expand senior visits, and integrate supply‑chain monitoring.
Rung 2: Security clarity + pre‑positioning. Establish a permanent U.S. liaison group in Taipei with joint exercises, munitions stockpiles, and real‑time intelligence fusion. Pre‑position coastal defense missiles and air defense components already sold under the TRA. Invite Taiwan as an observer to major U.S. exercises in the Pacific and Caribbean.
Rung 3: De facto recognition + procurement preference. Exchange envoys, sign a limited defense understanding, and treat Taiwan as “domestic” for specified U.S. procurement under the Defense Production Act and Maritime Administration programs.
Rung 4: Formal recognition. If China crosses defined thresholds of strategic control in the Americas or coercive acts against U.S. partners, begin recognition of the Republic of China as a sovereign state, coordinated with select allies.
Public triggers: PRC control or concessionary dominance of two additional deep‑water hubs in the hemisphere; majority stakes in power distribution serving any capital region; deployment of PLA‑associated personnel to operate or secure infrastructure.
Risk, blowback, and the counters we control
Expect economic threats. Build buffers now. Accelerate nuclear, gas, and hydro; re‑shore mid‑tier manufacturing into Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean inside the tariff wall with ironclad anti‑transshipment. Create a hemisphere‑wide CFIUS screen for ports, power, telecom, rail, and data centers.
Finance the alternative: launch a Monroe Facilities Window at DFC/EXIM to co‑finance ports, grids, and freight that meet security standards; tie money to American equipment and union training. Replace “open market access” with an Americas Production Preference (APP) across U.S. procurement—Buy American plus Buy Hemispheric, but only for PSC signers with zero PRC control in the chain.
A 90‑day action program
- Publish the PSC negative list and the input‑tariff schedule (zero for raw and midstream inputs; steep for finished manufactures).
- Issue U.S. export share targets for partner public procurement (e.g., ≥60% of government IT from U.S.-assembled systems) and tie DFC/EXIM financing to those targets.
- Announce a Compute Industrial Base Order: shift all federal server/laptop buys to U.S.-assembled systems with ≥75% hemispheric value content; require U.S. boards and memory for sensitive networks.
- Adopt U.S.-flag carriage preference for lithium, copper, iron, refined fuels, and grid hardware on PSC routes.
- Stand up USD clearing rails for PSC trade through supervised correspondents; blacklist banks that facilitate PRC‑controlled concessions.
- Codify kill‑switch anti‑circumvention: transshipment = automatic surcharges, quota cuts, or time‑bound embargoes.
- Keep Rung 1 live: rename Taipei’s office, open PSC talks, schedule senior delegations, and begin pre‑positioning planning. No FTAs, no ISDS—managed access only.
The point
The Monroe Doctrine is not nostalgia. It is geographic common sense. China is testing whether the United States still believes that. Tariffs alone will not answer the test. If Beijing turns this hemisphere into an extension of its logistics and finance empire, the correct response is to put their core political project at risk. Tie One China to their behavior in our neighborhood. Make the cost of encroachment unmistakable. Then give the Americas a better offer and mean it.